🚀 Project Ideas
Generating project ideas…
Summary
- Replace unsafe
system() calls in privileged dialogs with a minimal execve‑based helper running in a disposable VM, eliminating shell injection.
- Core value: secure error/user dialogs from untrusted input without compromising QubesOS isolation.
Details
| Key |
Value |
| Target Audience |
QubesOS users and developers building privileged tools that need to show UI from untrusted data |
| Core Feature |
A small privileged VM that receives sanitized payload via qrexec and displays dialogs using GTK/Qt without invoking shell; provides a C library wrapper replacing system() |
| Tech Stack |
C, GTK+, Qubes qrexec, libvmi (optional), minimal Xen VM |
| Difficulty |
Medium |
| Monetization |
Hobby |
Notes
- HN commenters highlighted the danger of
system() with attacker‑controlled filenames in dom0 (e.g., “Allwinkt: The worst part is that in 2020 they explicitly documented that the remote filename is attacker controlled,but still allowed it to reach system()”) – SafeDialog would eliminate this class of bugs.
- Could spark discussion on secure UI patterns and be adopted by QubesOS upstream.
Summary
- Offload GPU driver execution to an isolated VM and expose a virtual GPU to other VMs via virtio‑gpu, providing hardware acceleration while keeping the driver out of dom0.
- Core value: enable GPU‑accelerated applications (e.g., video playback, CUDA) in QubesOS without sacrificing security.
Details
| Key |
Value |
| Target Audience |
QubesOS power users who need graphics performance (developers, journalists, researchers) |
| Core Feature |
A dedicated VM running the host GPU driver with a virtio‑gpu backend; other VMs attach to it as a virtual GPU, receiving accelerated rendering |
| Tech Stack |
Linux kernel with VFIO/passthrough, virtio‑gpu, Qubes VM infrastructure, Rust or C for management daemon |
| Difficulty |
High |
| Monetization |
Revenue-ready: $5/month per user for managed VM images or support |
Notes
- Commenters lamented lack of hardware acceleration: “IMHO the thing that is holding back QubesOS is the lack of hardware acceleration for graphics” (zby) and “Even with all its drawbacks, there is something really nice about being able to run different applications over Tor…” (jwrallie). VirtGPU directly addresses this.
- Could lead to broader discussion on secure GPU virtualization and be a candidate for inclusion in QubesOS contrib.
Summary
- A security‑focused desktop OS built on KVM/libvirt instead of Xen, offering VM‑based isolation similar to QubesOS but with better hardware compatibility and standard Linux kernel.
- Core value: drop‑in replacement for QubesOS that leverages mainstream virtualization, easing driver support and enabling features like nested virtualization.
Details
| Key |
Value |
| Target Audience |
Security‑conscious users who find QubesOS hardware support limiting; developers wanting a Linux‑kernel based secure desktop |
| Core Feature |
A set of scripts and metadata that create disposable VMs (AppVMs) managed by libvirt, with a dom0‑like privileged host running a minimal, hardened Linux kernel; uses secure boot, SELinux, and isolated networking |
| Tech Stack |
Linux kernel, KVM, libvirt, systemd, SELinux, Qubes‑style salt templates (optional), Rust for management CLI |
| Difficulty |
Medium |
| Monetization |
Hobby |
Notes
- Multiple HN commenters wished for a KVM‑based alternative: “I wish a similar distro would be made based on KVM so that the standard kernel could be used.” (fsflover, Tom Alexander). KubeQube fulfills that desire.
- Would generate discussion on Xen vs KVM trade‑offs and could attract contributors frustrated by Xen driver lag.
