Three prevalent themes in the discussion
- What counts as a “security company” and the role of open‑source/not‑for‑profit models
- “Any company where understanding of security practices has a direct impact on its revenue from early phases can be considered as a security company in my view.” — sandeepkd
- “The basic software is open source, and the list is free if you're running the tool and contributing detections back.” — itintheory
- “From what I have seen a large chunk of internet exists and stands on the shoulder of folks who did the volunteer work cause they were passionate about it.” — sandeepkd
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“What, exactly, is the definition of a 'security company' in your mind? Threat Intel companies definitely fall under that normally…” — strictnein
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Limitations of IP‑reputation/blocklist approaches and the need for behavioral/fingerprinting defenses
- “We implemented CrowdSec for bot/scraping mitigation. The architecture is sound, but it ended up having an unacceptable false positive rate for us.” — itintheory
- “Given the number of residential proxies I see scraping … IP address‑based blocking useful anymore… Behavioral and client fingerprint analysis … is the only way.” — EvanAnderson
- “They are non-stop and could have ingested all of our content many times over every day. JA4 is useless too because they have the ability to spoof…” — specialp
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“I have written my own honeypots to reduce the false positive rate.” — UltraSane
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Criticism of CrowdSec’s own security practices following the source‑code leak
- “yet another security oriented company that doesn’t practice what they preach.” — xyst
- “It wasn't the Github that was compromised, it was the access to their private repository that was compromised so somewhere down the line the security best practices are in question for sure.” — sandeepkd
- “The thing that works in their favor is that no one else can verify it either which absolves them from any responsibility.” — strictnein
- “If it’s in Debian repos I expect it to work with full functionality.” — getcrunk