Three prevalent themes in the discussion
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Assessment of DDS as a middleware – Commenters weigh DDS’s suitability, noting its OMG origins, limited composability, and mixed vendor‑independence claims.
“DDS is the least bad of the stuff that has come out of OMG, but it's not a nice middleware still. There is no underlying algebra of that composes nicely when compared to Zenoh for example, and the 'vendor independence' and compatibility is usually a joke.” — j‑pb
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Obscurity/security rationale in military systems – Many argue that deliberate secrecy (security by obscurity) protects against adversaries and even prevents misuse by friendly troops.
“Obscurity is part of the allure, not a repulsive factor. You don't want a hostile nation suddenly and easily understanding your systems.” — esseph
“Often connectors are even proprietary. (This is partially to protect systems not from the enemy, but from the troops themselves…)” — esseph -
Legacy, standardization, and political inertia – The DoD’s inability to impose new standards stems from entrenched contractors, political considerations, and massive existing point‑to‑point/ radio‑based networks that predate TCP/IP.
“The DOD effectively can't 'just mandate' things and it's because of politics (which is a superset of corruption and incompetence).” — aidenn0
“A lot of military comms are point-to-point or broadcast between radios where TCP/IP doesn’t really make sense… There’s a lot of inertia to maintain compatibility.” — openasocket