IdeaWell

Project ideas from Hacker News discussions.

Obsidian plugin was abused to deploy a remote access trojan

Original Article

Hacker News Discussion

📝 Discussion Summary (Click to expand)

4 Dominant Themes inthe Discussion

Theme Core Insight Representative Quote
1. Plugins run with unrestricted system access Community plugins inherit full OS privileges – they can read/write any file, reach the internet, and even install programs. “Community plugins can access files on your computer. Community plugins can connect to internet. Community plugins can install additional programs.” — Groxx
2. Attack exploits a multi‑step social‑engineering flow Victims must enable community plugins and sync a malicious vault, then trust remote plugins – warnings are buried and easy to ignore. “The attack here requires not just enabling community plugins, but also syncing the attacker's vault to your computer, and also separately enabling the synchronization of the attacker's plugins with yours.” — ImPostingOnHN
3. Need for granular, OS‑style permission prompts Users demand a system where each plugin explicitly asks for needed permissions (storage, network, etc.) before execution, similar to iOS/Android. “Obsidian needs a granular permission system, where each plugin should have to declare and prompt you to allow or reject specific permissions, just like on iOS and Android.” — criddell
4. The ecosystem’s reliance on plugins is a design flaw The official promotion of plugins obscures their security risk, amounting to misleading marketing for non‑technical users. “They're trying to get all the benefits while pushing the extremely‑obvious‑to‑them downsides into subpages. It's intentionally misleading for non‑technical users.” — Groxx

These four threads capture the main community concerns: the inherent insecurity of the current plugin model, the socially engineered attack vector, calls for proper sandboxing with permission dialogs, and criticism that Obsidian’s messaging downplays those risks.

🚀 Project Ideas

Secure SandboxedPlugin Runtime for Obsidian

Summary

  • Provides OS‑level sandboxing and per‑plugin permission prompts, stopping community plugins from inheriting full disk and network access.
  • Enables safe use of powerful plugins without forcing users to disable security warnings.

Details

Key Value
Target Audience Obsidian power users, enterprises handling confidential notes
Core Feature Isolated execution of each plugin with granular permission dialogs
Tech Stack Electron wrapper + Flatpak/AppImage sandbox, Linux namespaces/Firejail, WASM permissions engine
Difficulty High
Monetization Revenue-ready: $5 /mo subscription for premium sandbox profiles and policy manager

Notes

  • HN commenters repeatedly stress “full disk access” as a show‑stopper; they'd love a permission model that requires explicit consent (quoting Ferox about “full disk access without warning”).
  • Could spark discussion on integrating with existing Obsidian settings UI and on cross‑platform support.

PluginVigil – Automated Security Auditing Service for Community Plugins

Summary

  • Continuously scans new/updated community plugins for malicious patterns, exposed secrets, and unsafe system calls.
  • Delivers a risk score and one‑click allow/deny recommendation directly inside Obsidian.

Details

Key Value
Target Audience Individual users, small teams, security‑conscious developers
Core Feature Fully automated static & dynamic analysis pipeline with sandboxed execution and CVE‑level reporting
Tech Stack Python backend, Docker containers, CodeQL + Semgrep, FastAPI, SQLite risk DB
Difficulty Medium
Monetization Revenue-ready: $1 per scan after 5 free scans/month, or $10 /mo unlimited tier

Notes

  • Referencing cpac’s comment about “community plugins can install additional programs” – users would value an independent audit layer.
  • Opens conversation on integrating risk scores into Obsidian’s plugin marketplace and on community trust models.

Obsidian Core Enhancer (OCE) – Official Plugin‑Free Feature Pack

Summary

  • Bundles high‑demand functionalities (tables calculations, calendar view, task manager) directly into Obsidian, eliminating reliance on third‑party plugins. - Delivers these features inside the same sandboxed permission framework introduced in Secure Sandboxed Plugin Runtime.

Details

Key Value
Target Audience Existing Obsidian users who currently use plugins like Advanced URI, Dataview, or Tasks
Core Feature Official, officially‑signed modules with permission‑aware APIs (e.g., limited file access only to vault folder)
Tech Stack TypeScript/Electron extensions, sandboxed context isolation, optional WASM core
Difficulty Medium
Monetization Revenue-ready: $15 one‑time purchase for Pro version with premium themes and priority updates

Notes

  • Community members like “ImPostingOnHN” mention missing “ADD/SUM” and “calendar” features; they'd adopt a built‑in solution.
  • Sparks discussion on balancing official feature rollout speed vs. community plugin ecosystem.

Cross‑App Plugin Permission Standard (CAPPS) – Open Specification & SDK

Summary

  • Defines a universal plugin permission manifest and runtime enforcement model (WASM‑based, least‑privilege) that any app can adopt.
  • Provides an SDK for developers to sandbox plugins while exposing only explicitly declared capabilities.

Details

Key Value
Target Audience developers of note‑taking, IDE, or productivity apps; OS vendors
Core Feature Permission manifest (JSON) + runtime sandbox that enforces least‑privilege access, with UI prompts mirroring Android/iOS patterns
Tech Stack Rust/Wasm runtime, TypeScript definitions, CI pipeline for compliance testing
Difficulty High
Monetization Hobby

Notes

  • Echoes groxx’s call for “taint‑influenced capabilities” and Ferris’s comment about “majority of software sandboxed”; HN would likely discuss adoption barriers and potential for industry‑wide standardization.

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