1. Security theater vs. real protection
Many commenters argue that the turnstiles were more about optics than safety.
“It’s just security theater… they give an active record of who is in the building, and stop unauthorized people, but they also give so much comfort that we neglect the other types of threats.” – firefoxd
“Security theater, perhaps. Don’t underestimate the degree to which those turnstiles were intended to serve the purpose of tracking employees’ movements.” – CoffeeOnWrite
2. Physical‑security implementation is often flawed or over‑designed
The discussion repeatedly points out that the system caused long lines, was poorly integrated with elevators, and didn’t actually stop theft or intrusions.
“Those turnstiles were inefficient (slowed legitimate users down), but not security theater (they really blocked unauthorized access.)” – knallfrosch
“I never felt the office was insecure, except in retrospect once it was actually secure.” – hamdingers
3. Threat‑model matters – people care more about visible risks
Management tends to focus on the dramatic (active shooters) while abstract risks (cookie‑based credential theft) are ignored.
“An active shooter is easy to visualize and understand whereas unsecured credentials stored in cookies are an abstract and difficult to visualize problem for management.” – horeszko
“The threat model is ‘confine a hostile person to a specific part of the building once they’ve gotten in while law enforcement arrives,’ less than preventing someone from coat tailing their way into the building at all.” – jez
These three themes capture the bulk of the conversation: the tension between appearance and effectiveness, the practical shortcomings of the physical‑security system, and the mismatch between perceived and real threats.